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Beyond Program Explanation
1 
 
In a number of articles over the years, and especially in The Common Mind, 
Philip Pettit has defended a distinctive and influential solution to the so-called 
‘problem of mental causation’ – the problem of how minds can make a causal 
difference to the world.  This view has become known as “program explanation”, 
hereafter PE.  As its name indicates, PE is more than just a proposal purporting to 
solve the problem of how our minds can influence events in the physical world.  It is 
also an account of how the ‘special’ sciences can be explanatorily autonomous.  The 
‘problem’ addressed by PE is multifaceted, and we cannot deal with all of its aspects 
here.  In what follows, we want to concentrate on that part of his proposal that deals 
with issues concerning mental causation, since inter alia PE is meant to demonstrate 
how mental properties can be causally relevant to the behaviour they explain.  We 
begin by outlining the problem of mental causation that concerns us.  We then give a 
brief account of Pettit’s solution, indicating what we take to be its principal 
shortcomings, before providing what we take to be the correct solution.  We develop 
our criticism of PE by elaborating on the metaphysics of the preferred alternative.   
Finally, we reinforce our view by showing how it can be deployed to defeat a 
powerful argument, mounted by Jaegwon Kim, against the possibility of causally 
relevant emergent properties. 
 
1. Introducing  The  Problem 
 
What is the problem that appeal to PE is meant to solve?  Classically, the 
mental causation problem arises as a consequence of a commitment to non-reductive 
                                                 
1 Versions of parts of this paper have been read at a number of venues, including the Research School 
of Social Sciences at The Australian National University, the Australasian Philosophical Association 
(NZ Division) Conference at the University of Otago (1999), The South African Philosophical 
Association Conference (2000), and the University of Massachusetts (Amherst).  We are grateful to 
audiences for their comments.  We are also indebted to Tim Elder and Michael Smith for their 
comments on the penultimate draft.   2
physicalism, together with some supplementary assumptions concerning causation.
2   
The thesis of physicalism entails a monist ontology, which we take minimally to 
involve the claim that all events are physical events.
3  The non-reducibility claim 
requires acknowledging that some of these events are also mental events, which we 
take to be the claim that although every event that has a mental property has a 
physical property, the mental and physical properties are irreducibly distinct.  There 
are two relevant assumptions concerning causality in play.  The first is that mental 
events, specifically, believings, desirings, hopings, intendings, can cause physical 
effects.  The second is that physical effects have sufficient physical causes.  The 
question that immediately arises is: does the ‘mentality’ of the mental events 
contribute to the production of effects thus caused?  Prima facie it would appear not; 
the ‘physicality’ of those physical causes does all the work.  
This problem is sharpened if one accepts, as Pettit seems to do (and we 
certainly do), a certain metaphysical view of the nature of events involved in the 
causal transaction.  This metaphysics requires that events be exemplifyings or 
instancings of properties in objects at, or during intervals of times.  This is the 
Property-Exemplification Account of events (hereafter PEA), one that we describe in 
more detail later.  According to it, a mental event just is the exemplifying of a mental 
property in an object at a time, and also has various properties, such as the property of 
being an exemplifying of a mental property in an object at a time.  For example, the 
event which is my thinking of Vienna now just is the exemplifying in me now of the 
property, thinks of Vienna (a property of me), and that event has the property of being 
a thinking of Vienna.  Similarly, a physical event just is the exemplifying of a 
physical property in an object at a time, and it too will have various properties.  Given 
the physicalist commitment, each mental event, i.e., exemplifying of a mental 
property, will be (i.e., be identical with) an exemplifying of a physical property.
4 
                                                 
2 ‘Non-reductive physicalism’ is anomalous monism without the commitment to there being no 
psychological or psychophysical laws.  We avoid this commitment just because the notion of ‘law’ at 
stake is controversial.  Nothing hangs on this issue in this paper.   
3 We speak here of events, but the thesis is intended to cover all mental phenomena, however they are 
to be analyzed in terms of events. 
4 In the terminology preferred by Kim, whose version of the account we describe here and develop 
further in section 4, events are exemplifications of properties by objects at times.  But Kim himself, and 
many others who take a universalist rather than a tropist view of properties, often use the terms 
‘instance’ as alternatives to the term ‘exemplification’ (and thus claim, for example, that a mental event 
is an instance of a property at a time in an object).  We ourselves prefer ‘exemplifyings’ to 
‘exemplifications’ (along the lines of Lombard (1986)), since it makes clear that events are 
fundamentally changes, whose ‘constitutive’ properties are dynamic rather than static, or its cognate   3
Further, events themselves have properties, and have them by instantiating 
them.   Now the problem looks like this: can the mental property of a mental/physical 
event exercise any causal influence?  The assumption that physical effects have 
physical causes now has the consequence that, in any case where there is putative 
mental causation of a physical effect, the physical property of the mental/physical 
event must be the one in virtue of which that event causes the physical effect.  The 
mental property looks inert; the only way of rescuing any causal influence on its 
behalf, so it seems, is to make the physical effect over-determined – brought about 
both in virtue of the mental/physical event’s being an instance of the physical 
property and in virtue of that event’s being an instance of the mental property.  Of 
course there may well be some cases of causal over-determination, but such 
systematic over-determination is exceedingly implausible, so this way out looks 
desperate.  Another way is to secure the causal effectiveness of the mental property of 
the event by identifying it with a physical property.  But this is a reductive move that 
looks increasingly implausible; and, in any case, requires the rejection of the position 
we wish to defend, non-reductive physicalism.  Epiphenomenalism looms. 
This is the problem that appeal to PE is meant to solve.  Or so one might 
suppose, given Pettit’s concentration on the task of making what he calls ‘higher-
order’ intentional states causally relevant to the production of behaviour.  In fact, 
though, Pettit sees the problem as two-fold, and we think that part of his reluctance to 
accept an alternative, metaphysically less baroque, solution lies in his conflation of 
                                                                                                                                            
term, ‘instancings’; since we think that failure to do so blurs the crucial distinction between a substance 
and an event.  Given the universalist (as contrasted with a tropist) view of properties, according to 
which an exemplification/instance of a property just is the thing that has it, we would have to say that 
Jones is the instance of the property, runs, since, according to the property-exemplification account, as 
developed by Kim, this is a property of Jones, and so is a constitutive property of the event which is 
Jones’s running.  But although Kim wants to say that the subject of that event is Jones, the 
exemplification of the property, runs by Jones is an event, a running, not the event’s subject.  We can 
avoid this problem altogether if we distinguish instances from instancings (i.e., exemplifyings), since 
we can then maintain (1) that an instance of a property is the thing that has it (whether this is an object 
or an event), (2) that events just are (i.e., are identical with) exemplifyings of dynamic properties of 
objects in those objects, and (3) that an instance of a property of an event just is the event that has that 
property.  Events, like any other entities, have properties by instantiating them, but their constitutive 
properties are not, according to PEA, properties that they possess. These distinctions are important to 
our solution to the problem of causal relevance, since only certain ways of developing the PEA will 
make that solution possible.  We return to this in section 4.  For more on the distinction between static 
and dynamic properties, and the differences between Kim’s and Lombard’s versions of the PEA, see 
Macdonald (1989).  
We would prefer to avoid the term ‘instances’ entirely, since it suggests a trope view of 
properties, which we reject.  But, since many parties to the dispute concerning the problem of mental 
causation, including Pettit and Kim (esp. Kim 2003), regularly talk of events as instances of properties   4
the two features of the problem, hinted at above.  The problem, which he introduces 
in the form of the question, “What is the relation between a higher-order [believing 
that p] and lower-order cause in virtue of which the higher-order counts as causally 
relevant?” (Pettit 1993: 33)), is divided into two parts.  First, there is “the state played 
a certain causal part” and, and second, there is “it did so in virtue of the property of 
being a belief that p” (Pettit 1993: 34).
5  We take the first feature (how the state can 
play a ‘causal part’) to be the problem of causal efficacy, and the second to be the 
problem of causal relevance.
6  Efficacy has to do with causes and effects 
extensionally conceived. Given that c caused e, any descriptions referring to c and e 
will (suitably arranged) yield a true causal statement.  This means that a description of 
c can pick out c by specifying any property c possesses, and likewise for e.  The 
extensionality of the causal relation ensures that whatever these properties are, the 
resulting causal statement will be true.  Given the profusion of properties possessed 
by all events (think of ‘mere’ Cambridge properties), it is clear that not all true causal 
claims will yield causally illuminating explanations of why e occurred.  This is why 
there is an issue of causal relevance, as distinct from causal efficacy: only some 
                                                                                                                                            
– intending the universalist view of properties as multiply-exemplifiable entities that can be (wholly) 
present in many places at the same time – we will, for present purposes, speak in these terms too. 
5 Again, Pettit and others speak of mental properties as higher-order properties, where we would use 
the term ‘higher-level’.  Higher-level properties should not be confused with higher-order ones.  
Higher-order properties are properties of properties, not properties of the things that have them in 
virtue of their possession of other properties.  It is common, especially in functionalist treatments in the 
philosophy of mind, to use ‘higher-order’ rather than ‘higher-level’ when talking about mental 
properties such as being in pain, or dispositional properties like solubility.  It’s important that it’s quite 
different from the contemporary logician’s usage (though similar to Russell’s and Ramsey’s).  In 
contemporary terms, ‘solubility’, like ‘being a number’, is a first-order predicate and so stands for a 
first-order property because its instances are particulars.  However, both predicates might be classed as 
impredicative, i.e., specificiable by phrases that include second-order quantification over all properties, 
including those properties themselves.  Thus, ‘λx(x is soluble)’ might be specified by something like, 
‘∃F(Fx &∀y(Fy &y is placed in water→y dissolves)’, where we have a second-order quantifier, ‘∃F’, 
which ranges over all properties, including solubility (just as the bound variable in ‘ιx(∀y(x l y→x is 
taller than y)’ impredicatively specifies the tallest person.  Pettit and others who are functionalists with 
regard to mental properties use the term ‘higher-order’ precisely because, in order to give the 
definitions of such properties, we need to use higher-order quantification.  They take such properties as 
being in pain, for example, as higher-order because it is the state of being in a state that is causally 
related to others in the way that is characteristic of pain.  However, for reasons just given, we take 
mental properties of events to be higher-level properties – properties of events that have them in virtue 
of their possession of other properties, rather than properties of properties of events.  Be that as it may, 
since many of the examples used by Pettit and others in the mental causation debate concern both 
higher-level and higher-order properties, and since the issue of realization of one property by another 
that is central to the debate seems to arise with regard both sorts of properties, we will, for present 
purposes, use the term ‘higher-order’ to cover both sorts of case.  
6 Things get a bit confusing, however, since, although Pettit speaks of properties and their instances, as 
we do, sometimes his talk of states is elliptical for talk of property-instances, and sometimes his talk of 
states is elliptical for talk of properties.  Here it looks like he means, by ‘state’, ‘event’ (i.e., ‘property-  5
properties of the event that is the cause are causally relevant to the production of the 
effect, so only those properties, suitably specified, will yield causal explanations of 
the effect.   Keeping this distinction in mind we can ask: which aspect of the mental 
causation problem does the PE strategy solve?  The problem of causal efficacy, the 
problem of causal relevance, or both?  We think that Pettit is more concerned with 
causal relevance, but this leads him to adopt an unusual, and ultimately very 
implausible, approach to the problem of causal efficacy.  Or so we shall argue. 
 
2. The Program Explanation Solution 
 
Fundamentally, the PE strategy construes the notion of a mental property’s 
“determining an effect” as non-causal.  PE thus bites the bullet: mental (and 
presumably all other special science properties) are not causally efficacious, in the 
sense that events that are instances of them do not bring about the effects they do in 
virtue of being instances of such properties.  Mental properties are taken to be higher-
order properties that supervene on physical properties of events.  In any case where a 
mental property is thought to be causally efficacious in the production of an action (in 
the sense just specified), what really happens is that the instantiation of the higher-
order (mental) property “ensures that” a lower-order (physical) property is 
instantiated, this lower-order-property doing the causal work (again, in the sense that 
the event that is an instance of that lower-order property brings about the action in 
virtue of being an instance of that property).  As Pettit puts the point, 
The general idea in the program model…is that a higher-order property 
is causally relevant to something when its instantiation ensures or at 
least probabilifies, in a non-causal way, that there are lower-order 
properties present which produce it. (Pettit 1993: 37) 
So an instantiation of a mental property will “program for” the instantiation of those 
physical properties required for the production of the physical effect.  The “ensuring 
that” and “programming for” are non-causal relations so there is no causal 
competition between mental and physical properties, and so no over-determination.  
In addition to solving the over-determination problem, the PE model is said to 
have the virtue of presenting intentional causation as like many other cases of higher-
                                                                                                                                            
instance’), but, as we shall see, at other times he seems to mean ‘property’.  See especially our   6
order causation.  To this end the PE model is supported by various examples in which 
it is alleged that one finds just such a higher-order programming for lower-order 
properties whose instantiations then cause the effects that one may have thought were 
caused by (instantiations of) the higher-order property.  Thus, consider the eraser’s 
elasticity, which enables it to bend. Its elasticity is a higher-order property, realized 
by a lower-order property, its having a certain molecular structure.  The elasticity is 
said to non-causally program for its realization by a relevant molecular-structural 
property, instances of this lower-order property then producing the bending effect.   
Thus, it is claimed, “The dispositional state programs for the bending.” (Pettit 1993: 
39)
7  We return to this example later. 
The PE strategy and model works with a number of assumptions, four of 
which are salient to our discussion.  First, the model assumes that the lower-order 
property that is causally effective need not be the most immediate lower-order 
property; it may be one further down the ladder, so to speak.  That is, the model is 
agnostic concerning the level at which causal efficacy resides.  Second, the strategy 
does not take on board the problem of showing how causation works; it is intended to 
be compatible with most theories of causation.  Third, the model is to be interpreted 
as an ontological one.  “It is an account of how, in the objective arrangement of 
things, higher-order causes relate to their lower-order counterparts.  It is not an 
account of how we must subjectively come to know that certain higher-order causes 
are causally relevant.” (Pettit 1993: 35)  Fourth, the strategy takes as its metaphysical 
basis the distinction between properties and their instances: properties are abstract and 
universal, their instances are worldly, and so only instances of properties are involved 
in causal transactions.  
Brief comments about these background assumptions are in order.  We accept 
the first – the causal ‘grounding’ of a higher-order property need not take place at an 
order immediately ‘below’ it.  However, the second is problematic.  On some 
accounts of causation, the strategy does not work.  This becomes apparent when we 
cite our main complaint against the PE model, in section 3.  We accept the ontological 
constraint of the third assumption, and also the specific metaphysical commitments 
made by the fourth assumption.  Any account of mental causation should be as 
                                                                                                                                            
discussion of his examples in section 3.   7
ontologically robust as are accounts of any other kind of causation.  Otherwise, it 
risks not being about what it sets out to be an account of, the obvious fact that our 
minds are causally active (by which we mean here, so as not to beg questions, that 
mental properties are causally relevant to the events that instances of them ‘produce’).   
The metaphysics of properties as universals has been challenged, but it is common to 
both PE and our preferred solution, so it will not be questioned here.  
 
3.  The Problem with Program Explanation 
 
With causal explanation we assume that the cause cited in the explanation is 
crucial to any account of how it works as an explanation.  Similarly, the PE strategy 
will work only if the ‘program’ part of the account illuminates how the ‘explains’ part 
works.  This debt is paid by appeal to an analogy with the operation of a computer 
program, where the implementation of the program requires that lower-order 
electrical properties are brought into play.  So the explanation is secured in similar 
fashion to the way that appeal to causes secures explanation: the effect is brought 
about by the explaining feature(s).  This example makes it look like programming 
properties secure the causal effectiveness of the lower-order properties they program 
for in a causal way.  But it is clear that this is not how programming properties are 
envisaged as carrying out their programming work; they are meant to carry out this 
work in a non-causal way.  That is the point of the PE strategy as applied to the 
problem of mental causation – that it avoids over-determination problems by taking 
physical properties to carry out the causal work and taking mental properties to non-
causally ensure that there will be physical properties available to carry out that work.   
As we see it, there are two, related, problems that make this solution 
implausible.  The first surfaces when one asks how in general such programming is 
effected.  How, exactly, do the higher-order properties non-causally ensure that the 
causally effective lower-order properties are instantiated?  The second appears when 
one considers the most attractive answer to this question.  
Consider the first.  The problem is that, on a plausible reading of Pettit’s 
account, the higher-order and lower-order properties are separately instantiated, and 
                                                                                                                                            
7 Pettit mentions two other examples, that of boiling water causing a crack in its container, and the 
failure of a square peg to fit into a round hole.  Neither of these are cases of higher-order properties 
programming for the instantiation of their realizing properties, so we set them aside.   8
the most natural way to interpret the ensuring relation between different property-
instances is causally.  Clearly this interpretation of ensuring depends upon the 
property-instances being separate (non-identical) so we need to support this 
understanding of what Pettit says.  
There are two reasons for thinking that the program model requires that the 
property-instances be non-identical. The first derives from how Pettit describes its 
essential features. Take the three conditions he places on a property’s being a 
‘programming property’: 
 
1.  Any instantiation of the higher-order property non-causally involves the 
  instantiation of certain properties – maybe these, maybe those – at a lower 
 order. 
2. The lower-order properties associated with instantiations of the higher-
  order, or at least most of them, are such as generally to produce an E-type 
  event in the given circumstances. 
3. The lower-order properties associated with the actual instantiation of the 
  higher-order property do in fact produce E.  (Pettit 1993: 37) 
 
What these quoted passages make clear is that Pettit’s model works not only 
with an ontology of higher-order and lower-order properties, but also of higher-order 
and lower-order ‘states’, or instantiations of properties.
 8  It is also clear that if the 
proper construal of the relation between the instances were that they are identical, it 
would have been easy to say so, rather than to leave it at the vague and non-defined 
‘association’ between the instances. So we think that a natural reading of these 
passages forces the non-identity interpretation, and with it the thought that the 
ensuring relation between the separate instances is a causal relation, it being plausible 
to think that one event (property-instantiation) ensures that another occurs only if it 
causes, or causally contributes to, the occurrence of the latter. 
The temptation to interpret ensure causally is strengthened by another locution 
employed by Pettit: “The factor that programs for an effect…non-causally arranges 
things (it means that things are arranged) so that there will be such a producer state – 
                                                 
8 There is a question of how this can be reconciled with a further view, articulated a few pages earlier 
in his account of causal relevance, that there is token identity between the role (higher-order) state and   9
maybe this, maybe that – available to do the work.” (Pettit 1993: 37, italics added)
9  
How one property can be such that its instantiation non-causally arranges things so 
that an instance of another property produces the effect, though, is mysterious. What 
seems to be required here is a de re relation between separate instances of two 
properties such that the one instance (non-causally) produces (ensures, arranges for) 
the second instance, this latter instance producing (causing) the effect.
10  The natural 
reading of both ‘producing’ relations here is causal, and we have been given no 
reason to think otherwise, apart from the convenient fact that making the first 
production non-causal avoids causal over-determination. So on our favoured reading 
the ensuring relation holds between (separate) property-instances, and this makes it 
difficult to see this relation in anything other than causal terms.  
Our second reason for the ‘separate-instance’ interpretation arises from 
considering a different understanding of what is going on, one that says: the 
‘arrangement’ of the higher-order and lower-order properties is such that whenever 
the one is instanced, so is the other. Here the ensuring work is done at the property 
level, so the accusation that causality is implicated is neatly avoided. And this reading 
is supported by a functionalist account of the relation between mental and physical 
properties, a relation of role property to realizing property, where a mental state (such 
as pain, or the belief that p) is the occupant of certain causal role, the causal role 
definitive of the mental type in question (in the Ramsey/Lewis style). Now, there is 
no difficulty understanding the claim that the role properties non-causally ensure the 
existence of realizing properties, but the most natural way of making metaphysical 
sense of this connection in these cases is by identifying the instantiations, and, for 
reasons to which we return later, that is a result Pettit wishes to avoid.  For one thing, 
this result would also ensure that the higher-order property is causally efficacious, 
                                                                                                                                            
the realizer (lower-order) state (Pettit 1993: 33) (though we note that Pettit, rightly in our view, does 
not think this solves the problem of the causal relevance of properties).  
9 Again, by ‘producer state’ here Pettit seems to mean, not ‘property’ but ‘property-instance’. 
10 Actually, this makes it look as though Pettit might be flirting with a trope conception of properties, 
rather than a universalist one.  Given that, on the latter view, an instance of a property just is the thing 
that has it, it is difficult to make sense of what is going on here without supposing either that the mental 
event and the physical event are distinct (in being distinct instances of distinct properties), which Pettit 
clearly is not supposing, or that the property-instances, in being distinct instances, are tropes.  This 
latter would allow him to say that mental events are physical events, but only by committing him to the 
view that such events are constituted by both mental tropes and physical tropes.  Trope theories of 
mental causation also suffer from the problem of causal relevance, and we think they are in a worse 
position than the PEA to resolve it, though we haven’t the space to go into the reasons why here.  We 
discuss them in detail in C. Macdonald and G. Macdonald (forthcoming).   10
contradicting the claims made by advocates of Program Explanation.
11  For another, 
this co-instantiation account is one we have defended elsewhere (and below), and it 
has been criticized by Pettit for having the defect that “it would make a state like the 
belief that p causally relevant but relevant in virtue of a property other than that of 
being the belief that p: relevant in virtue of being such and such a neural or electronic 
state.” (Pettit 1993: 38) Although this criticism is couched in terms of causal 
relevance rather than causal efficacy, it is clear that the identity claim is being 
rejected, and with it any chance of rescuing the identity of the higher-order and lower-
order property instances.
12 We are left with the puzzle as to how the higher-order 
instance can non-causally ensure the instantiation of the lower-order property.  
Friends of the PE strategy might say that we are ignoring Pettit’s explanation 
of how programming works in the case of mental causation.  Consider an agent’s 
intentional state, say, S’s belief that p, which explains an agent’s action of A-ing.  The 
intentional state will program for the A-ing if, no matter how it is realized (variable 
realization being possible), the realizer (lower-order, physical) state, say, a particular 
neural state, tends to produce a type-A action.  (By ‘state’ Pettit here must mean 
‘property’ rather than ‘property-instance’, given that he takes the realization relation 
to hold between properties.  See note 6.)  That is, all of the possible realizers of the 
belief that p must be such that they tend to produce A (given certain background 
conditions).  The intentional state, the belief that p, is causally relevant to the agent’s 
A-ing just because it is realized by states, all of which tend to cause A-type actions 
(given the background conditions).  But this fact, that the intentional state is realized 
only by producers of A-type actions, cannot be just a happy accident, merely 
fortuitous.  If it were, then all cases of mental causation would depend on the huge 
coincidence that relevant higher-order intentional states are all realized, it so happens, 
by states with an appropriate causal profile.  To reduce such coincidence, Pettit relies 
on the assumption that agents are designed so that their higher-order intentional states 
will be realized by the appropriate lower-order, causally efficacious, neural states.   
This design assumption underwrites the ‘program’ part of the PE model: given 
                                                 
11 The claim that the identity of instances guarantees the causal efficacy of the higher-order property is 
defended below, but was first proposed by us in C. Macdonald and G. Macdonald (1986). Note that 
this does not guarantee the causal relevance of the higher-order property, but it is not relevance that is 
at issue here. See Section 5 below.  
12 We return to consider this objection, particularly as an objection to an account of causal relevance, at 
the beginning of Section 5.   11
adequate design, the instance of the higher-order property will ensure that there will 
be an instance of the lower-order property. 
Does this help with the problem of how the higher-order instance non-causally 
arranges for there to be an instance of the lower-order property?  We don’t think so. 
On the contrary, we think it makes the non-causal aspect of the story more 
implausible.  The natural way to think of design in this context is biological design, 
and this is the way Pettit thinks of it: “…we may readily assume that any natural 
intelligence is going to have been designed, under evolutionary and perhaps cultural 
pressures, to meet suitable design specifications.” (Pettit 1993: 41)  One must 
presume that the designer here is natural selection, where such selection includes 
cultural selection, whatever that turns out to be.  But any selection-style story about 
design will be resolutely causal, relying on the selection process operating on the 
effects of the properties it selects.  Brutally briefly, the story will be that some 
properties have instances whose effects in a particular environment make their 
possessors more likely to replicate themselves (more likely than competitors lacking 
the relevant properties), thus producing more instances of those properties.  This 
clearly requires that the property-instances be causally efficacious in the selection 
process, so this part of the PE model strengthens the feeling that the causal power of 
the intentional property is being discarded in an unprincipled way, just to avoid the 
over-determination problem. 
A critic may point to cases in which a property is ‘non-causally’ selected 
because it is regularly correlated with a property for which one can tell the 
appropriate causal story.  But reliance on such regular correlations is not available to 
the PE model, as it is trying to explain such regular correlations between instances of 
higher-order properties and instances of appropriate lower-order realizing properties. 
This brings us to the second, related problem with the PE model mentioned 
earlier, which is that many accounts of causality would have trouble denying the 
status of cause to the instance of the higher-order property.  Consider, for example, a 
counterfactual account.  Since the PE model requires that, had the higher-order 
property not been instanced, the effect would not have occurred, such an account 
renders the higher-order property a cause of the effect.  Or, consider Woodward’s 
recent ‘manipulation theory’ of cause and causal explanation, which states that “as a 
rough approximation, a necessary and sufficient condition for X to cause Y or to 
figure in a causal explanation of Y is that the value of Y would change under some   12
intervention on X in some background circumstances….” (Woodward 2003: 15).  
This also makes an instance of a higher-order property a cause.  In order for the PE 
strategy to work in the requisite way on this theory, it is necessary for the supposedly 
non-causally productive instance to be susceptible to interventions that would change 
instantiations of the lower-order property, and hence change the effect produced.  But 
if so, then Woodward’s condition on something’s being a cause is met.  Again, apart 
from the convenience of avoiding a problem (over-determination), it is difficult to see 
why one would want to deny that the instance of the higher-order property is causally 
efficacious. 
 
4. Our  Alternative 
 
Our diagnosis of what goes wrong with the PE model is that it assumes that 
the higher-order and lower-order properties must have distinct (non-identical) 
instances.  This is what generates the puzzle about how it is that the first instance non-
causally produces the second instance.  Our view is that one can employ the same 
metaphysics of properties and instances (presuming a universalist, rather than a 
tropist, view of properties) and rescue the causal efficacy of the mental by rejecting 
this assumption, i.e., by identifying the instances of the mental and physical properties 
of events (as well as by identifying the events that exemplify them).   
A more comprehensive metaphysical basis for this resolution is supplied by 
the Property-Exemplification Account of events, (PEA).
13  As noted earlier in our 
discussion, according to it, events are exemplyings of (n-adic) act-or event properties 
at (or during intervals of) times in objects.  The objects in which such exemplifyings 
occur are the subjects of those events.  And the properties, whose exemplifyings in 
subjects just are events, are properties, not of events, but of their subjects.  For 
example, the event of Jones’ running at noon yesterday just is the exemplifying in 
Jones of a property of Jones, the property, runs, at noon yesterday.  Such properties 
are termed constitutive properties of events, and are so termed because they are the 
properties of subjects whose exemplifyings by those subjects just are events.  
Constitutive properties of events are properties whose exemplifying it is of the 
essence of those events to be.   13
In addition to constitutive properties, events also have characterizing 
properties.  These are properties events possess, at least some of which they possess 
in virtue of ‘having’ (i.e., being exemplifyings of) constitutive properties.  Thus, for 
example, the event that is the exemplifying of the property, runs, by Jones at noon 
yesterday, has as its constitutive property a property of Jones.  That event has the 
property of being a running. 
Events construed along these lines are sometimes referred to as ‘structured 
particulars’.  They are deemed so because they ‘have’ not only constitutive properties, 
but also constitutive objects (or subjects) and constitutive times.
14  That is to say, it is 
in the nature of any event to be an exemplifying of a property (of its subject) in a 
subject at a time.  Two conditions on events are essential to the account, one an 
existence condition and one an identity condition.  These are formulated for monadic 
events as follows: 
 
Existence Condition:  Event [x,P,t] exists if and only if the object x has the 
property P at time t. 
 
Identity Condition:  Event [x,P,t] is identical with event [y,Q,t’] if and only if 
the object x is identical with the object y, the property P is identical with the 
property Q, and the time t is identical with the time t’. 
                                                                                                                                            
13 We supply the necessary metaphysical details to allay the doubts of those who may think it cannot be 
supplied.  One such person is Stephen Yablo (1992), esp. p. 259.  
14 The exposition of the PEA here is based on work of Kim’s (esp. Kim (1976)).   According to Kim, 
although the first condition on events specified here is indispensable to the theory, the second, as 
formulated, is not.  The theory could proceed, for example, by defining the predicate ‘is an event’ over 
ordered n-tuples of objects, properties, and times.  In this case, the ordered triple, <x,P,t>, would be an 
event if and only if x has P at t; and the principles of set theory would guarantee the existence of the 
triple (assuming, of course, that x, P, and t exist).  But Kim himself appears to favour the first method 
over the second, and it is certainly the preferable one from the point of view of the phenomenon of 
causal interaction between events, where this is assumed to entail their positionality.  The claim that 
events have constitutive objects, properties, and times, should not be understood as the claim that they 
are in some way constituted by or composed of objects, properties, and times, these being related to 
each other in something like the way that a chair, say, is often viewed as composed of or constituted by 
its parts arranged in a certain way.  This much is clear from the fact that the relationships that the 
‘components’ of events bear to one another are very different from the relations that the components of 
physical things bear to one another.  In the case of an event, one component is exemplified by another, 
at yet another; and it is clear that whatever the constituents of a biological organism or an artifact may 
be, they do not bear this relationship to one another.  Given all of this, the claim that the components of 
events are constitutive of them amounts to the claim that they are essential to them.  Kim explicitly 
commits himself to some version of the latter.  For more on this, see Macdonald (1989).  Lombard 
(1986) agrees with Kim that the identity condition on events, as formulated, is not essential to the 
account, but for different reasons.  According to him, events can have more than one constitutive 
property, whereas the identity condition as formulated here assumes that each event has just one.   14
 
where x and y, P and Q, and t and t’ are variables ranging over objects, properties, and 
times, respectively. 
The PEA construes properties as both abstract and multiply exemplifiable; 
entities that can have, but are not identical with, their exemplifyings. According to it, 
to say that a mental event is identical with a physical event is to say that each event 
which is (= is identical with) an exemplifying of a mental property of a subject in that 
subject at a time is identical with an exemplifying of a physical property of that 
subject in that subject at that time. So, to say that a mental event is a physical event is 
to say that there is just one exemplifying of two properties, one mental, and one 
physical, by an object at a time.  Thus, appealing to the PEA in order to rescue causal 
efficacy for mental events requires simply recognizing that a single event can be 
(identical with) an exemplifying of both a mental and a physical property. 
What is the relation between mental and physical properties of persons – those 
properties whose exemplifyings just are mental/physical events?  On our view, mental 
properties whose exemplifyings just are mental events are not constitutive properties 
of those events, but rather, supervene on physical properties constitutive of such 
events, and, consequently, mental properties of events supervene on physical 
properties of events.
15   Given the identity condition on events imposed by the PEA, 
non-reductive physicalism requires rejection of the view that mental properties are 
constitutive properties of the events that have them, on the assumption that each event 
has only one constitutive property (but see note 14).  But, independently of this, the 
position is committed to some kind of supervenience thesis, since without such 
commitment it is difficult to fend off the charge that the position is irredeemably 
dualist because it acknowledges the presence in the natural world, if not of non-
physical events, of non-physical properties.  Many will think that such a position does 
not deserve the name ‘physicalist’.  
What kind of supervenience thesis best captures the relation between mental 
and physical and physical properties is a thorny issue, as is well known.
16  Still, for 
                                                 
15 Does the fact that mental properties are not constitutive properties of events show that physical 
events that are mental events are not in some sense ‘genuinely’ mental?  No, only that physicalism is 
contingently true. 
16 For some skeptical discussion of the value of appeal to psychophysical supervenience, see, for 
example, R. Miller (1990), A. Melnyk (1995), and J. Heil (1998).  For some examples of work on 
psychophysical supervenience that seeks to meet objections based on the claim that no satisfactory 
thesis can be found, see T. Horgan (1993) and T. Grimes (1991).   15
present purposes we can say this much.  Take supervenience between the mental and 
the physical to be that relation which holds between a mental property or set of 
properties, M and another, physical one, P, such that any two objects/events 
indiscernible with respect to P cannot diverge with respect to M.  Further, following 
Kim (1978, 1984), let us distinguish weak from strong supervenience.  Then we can 
define a relation of strong supervenience thus: 
 
SS:  M-properties strongly supervene on P-properties =df. For any possible 
worlds w and w*, and any individuals x and y, if x in w is a P-twin of y in w*, 
and the actual world’s laws of physics hold in both, then x in w is an M-twin 
of y in w*.
17 
 
where any x and y are M (/P) twins if and only if x and y are exactly alike with respect 
to their M (/P) properties. 
What does the issue of causal relevance of mental properties amount to in this 
context - the issue of whether the mental property of an event is causally effective in 
that event’s bringing about the effects it does?
18  Well, according to the PEA, events 
have (characterizing) properties as well as being the exemplifyings of properties.  
They have properties by exemplifying them.  Given this, and given the universalist 
understanding of properties to which PEA subscribes (see note 4), whereby an 
instance of a property just is (i.e., is identical with) the thing that has (exemplifies) it, 
                                                 
17 This is an adaptation of the definition of strong supervenience given by Brian McLaughlin in 
McLaughlin (1995).  By M-properties (/P-properties) we mean the non-empty set, M (/P), of 
properties.  We choose this version over Kim’s principally because it is weaker than Kim’s, though 
Kim’s entails it.  Kim’s implies that it is necessarily the case that if something has an M property, then 
it has some P property.  But SS could be true if twins had no P property at all.  It thus allows for the 
possibility that there might be purely mental worlds.  We think this consequence desirable, given that 
we take physicalism to be true and contingent, and given the possibility of variable realization of 
mental properties.  Kim blocks it only by assuming that P properties are properties of the P-type and by 
allowing complementation to be a property forming operator, so that –P, a negative property, is a way 
of being of the P- type.  But one might deny that there are any negative properties on the grounds that 
they have no causal powers, and we think that this is a plausible thing to do.  We adapt McLaughlin’s 
definition primarily by introducing the caveat ‘and the actual world’s laws of physics hold in both’ 
precisely because we take physicalism to be true and contingent.  Although we do not take the identity 
conditions of properties to be given in terms of their causal powers, we do take it that if properties are 
identical they have the same causal powers, and we take it that physical laws relate properties in virtue 
of their causal powers.  So worlds in which there are the same physical properties that there are in the 
actual world will be worlds in which the same physical laws hold.  
18 Again, as we point out in the text, we take the causal relevance of a property to be more than a matter  
of its instances being causally effective, i.e., causally efficacious.  But we do take this to be a necessary 
condition on causal relevance, so for present purposes we will not allude to other conditions that we   16
instances of mental properties of mental events are identical with instances of 
physical properties of physical events (since each mental event is identical with a 
physical event).  We take it that a necessary (but not sufficient) condition on causal 
relevance of properties is that instances of those properties are causally efficacious.
19  
So, to say that a mental property of a physical event is causally relevant is at least to 
say that an instance of that property, i.e., that event, is causally efficacious in bringing 
about an effect of that event.  According to our strategy, this will require that (mental) 
instance to be a physical instance, i.e., that one and the same event is an instance of 
both a mental and a physical property. 
That requirement would need to be met anyway, since, on the universalist 
conception presumed by the PEA, things exemplify properties, and a thing just is (i.e., 
is identical with) an instance of each property that it has.  Thus, an event exemplifies 
its properties, and it is (= is identical with) an instance of each property it has.  This 
alone makes it difficult to see what exactly is going on in the metaphysics of Pettit’s 
PE strategy, since he takes mental events to be identical with physical events, but 
wants to distinguish instances of higher-order properties (of events) from instances of 
lower-order ones, apparently using the PEA.  We think this isn’t possible.  So, given 
the metaphysics of the PEA and Pettit’s commitment to psychophysical event 
identity, there is independent reason to reject the ‘distinct property-instances’ view. 
But we also hold a further thesis, which applies specifically to higher-order 
and lower-order properties.  Things – objects, events, and other individual particulars 
– exemplify properties, but some properties they exemplify just by exemplifying 
others.  This is not the case with all properties that a thing exemplifies, even given the 
universalist conception of properties.  But it does apply to some.  Consider a red, 
square box.  It has the properties of being red and being square.  It also has the 
property of being coloured.  It is (identical with) an instance of each property that it 
has.  The box exemplifies the properties of being red, being square, and being 
                                                                                                                                            
take to be necessary as well.  For more on the other conditions, see note 19 below and C. Macdonald 
and G. Macdonald (1995). 
19 It is clearly not sufficient, since, given the view that an exemplification of a property is the thing that 
has it, every property exemplified by an event would be causally relevant whenever that event caused 
any effect.  So, in addition to (1) causal efficacy of their instances (i.e., events) we place two further 
conditions on the causal relevance of properties: (2) that the properties participate in a general 
‘pattern’, or network of relations, in nature (one example of which is the nomological pattern), and (3) 
the generality which the properties display must be of the right type for a given type of effect (e.g., if 
the pattern is the nomological pattern, the nomological property must be nomological for a certain type   17
coloured.   It does not exemplify the property of being square just by exemplifying the 
property of being red.  But it does exemplify the property of being coloured just by 
exemplifying the property of being red.
20 
Similarly, events exemplify properties.  But some properties they exemplify 
just by exemplifying others.  In the case of higher-order (mental) and lower-order 
(physical) properties of events, we claim that this is just what happens.  Thus, a 
mental event can exemplify the property, being a thinking of Vienna, just by 
exemplifying the property, say, being neuro-chemical event α.  We claim that this 
view has an independent plausibility; it is not invoked just to solve a problem of over-
determination. Where one property (or properties) of an event is said to realize 
another property (or properties) of that event, this is by far the most plausible way to 
construe the relation between the properties exemplified. 
Call this thesis the Property-Dependence Thesis, to distinguish it from 
another, weaker thesis that we also hold and which follows from the universalist 
conception of properties, the Co-instantiation Thesis.
21  According to the latter, a 
mental property and a physical property of an event can be co-instantiated in a single 
instance, i.e., there is just one instance of two properties.  This thesis is weaker than 
the Property-Dependence one, because on the universalist conception, all properties 
of an event are co-instantiated in a single instance – an event is just one instance of all 
of its properties, not just the higher-order and the lower-order ones.  Still, since, on 
our view, the stronger thesis entails the weaker one, it follows that, where P is the 
physical property realizing mental property M, there will be just one instance of both 
P and M, Pi, i.e., Mi.
22  Given this, the mental instance, Mi, will be causally efficacious 
whenever the physical instance, Pi, is – given the assumption we share with Pettit, 
that causes are worldly events.   
                                                                                                                                            
of effect).  For more on these conditions and our defense of them, see C. Macdonald and G. Macdonald 
(1995).  
20 But note that we do not think that the relation between mental and physical properties is a 
determinable/determinate relation, as some others (e.g., Yablo 1992) do.  So, in the case of the 
properties of being coloured and being red, the dependence thesis holds because that the object is an 
instance of the property of being colored is entailed by the fact that it is an instance of the property of 
being red.  In other cases, of which the mental/physical property case is one, the dependence will hold 
for a different reason. 
21 See C. Macdonald and G. Macdonald (1986). 
22 So, in what follows, when we claim that Pi=Mi – that is, that there is one instance of both a mental 
property and a physical property where mental properties are not identical with, or reducible to, 
physical ones – we mean more than just that there is just one instance of both a mental property and a 
physical property (since on the universalist conception of properties, an event is just one instance of all 
of its properties).  We mean that a mental event exemplifies M just by exemplifying P.   18
In short, our claim is twofold: (1) mental properties of persons supervene on 
their physical properties, and (2) mental properties of events supervene on their 
physical properties.   This is consistent with the view that an individual event can be 
an exemplifying of both a mental and a physical property (of a person), can be an 
instance of both a mental property and a physical property (of an event), and can be 
an instance of a mental property just by being an instance of a physical property (of 
an event).  Consequently, the epiphenomenalism problem that attaches to mental 
properties disappears, along with causal over-determination. 
 
5.  Resistance to the Preferred Alternative 
 
The temptation to resist the suggestion that there is just one instance of two 
properties, one mental and one physical, is, we think, a result of two separate but 
related thoughts, both of which we think are mistaken.  The first is the thought that 
distinct (non-identical) properties cannot share their instances, cannot be co-
instantiated. But this thought is clearly wrong.  Using an analogy we have used 
before, whenever the property being red is instanced, so is the property being 
coloured; it is very implausible to view the situation as anything other than one of a 
single instance of both properties, despite the non-identity of the properties being 
instanced.  In general, in any case of properties related as determinate to 
determinable, an instance of a determinate property will just be an instance of a 
determinable property.
23  The property of weighing less than 100 lbs can be instanced 
by instancing the property of weighing 2 lbs. The latter will also be an instance the 
properties of weighing less than 99 lbs, of weighing less than 98 lbs, and so on.  (Note 
that these are also all examples of cases in which the stronger, property-dependence 
thesis is true.)  It seems to us to be ontologically promiscuous to populate the world 
with extra instances whenever this happens.  There is just one instance, which 
happens to be of many properties. 
We stress that this is an analogy only: others have viewed it as no mere 
analogy, and have modeled the relation of mental to physical properties as a relation 
between determinable and determinate properties.
24  We do not think this is a correct 
                                                 
23 We first suggested this analogy in C. Macdonald and G. Macdonald (1986). For further elaboration 
see C. Macdonald and G. Macdonald (1995).  
24 See especially Yablo (1992).   19
analysis of the mental-physical relation.  One cannot infer from the fact that a person 
has a brain-property α that they have a mental property β (at least not without 
considerable empirical theoretical input), so one cannot infer from the fact that an 
event (an exemplifying of the brain-property α, i.e., an exemplifying of the mental 
property β) has the property of being an instance of the brain-property α that it has the 
property of being an instance of the mental property β.  However, one can infer from 
the fact that something has the property of being red that it has the property of being 
coloured.  Still, the determinate-determinable relation is just one example of a 
supervenience relation, and there are other examples of this latter relation that can 
underwrite our confidence that mental properties are co-instantiated with the physical 
properties upon which they supervene.  In particular, that higher-order properties are 
realized by lower-order properties makes the identification of their instances 
compelling.  At the very least the onus is on those who deny this identification to 
explain how the realizing instances come to be ‘separate existences’.  
The second thought responsible for resistance to our solution is that, although 
co-instantiation is possible, it does not provide for the causal relevance of the higher-
order property.  As we have seen, Pettit expresses the objection that on our view 
intentional states are given relevance “through construing them as identical with 
electronic or neural states”, this having the defect that “it would make a state like the 
belief that p causally relevant but relevant in virtue of a property other than that of 
being the belief that p: relevant in virtue of being such and such a neural or electronic 
state.” (Pettit 1993: 38)
25  We take it that this objection has the following form: being 
the belief that p will be causally relevant when it is capable of explaining an effect 
that would have been produced by instances of any of its realizing properties.  
Because its relevance is thus ‘general’ with respect to all of its realizers, the causal 
relevance of the higher-order mental property cannot be identified with the causal 
relevance of any particular (lower-order, physical) realizing property.  But, so the 
objection goes, our account, in identifying the events as it does, identifies the causal 
relevance of the mental property of the event with the relevance of a particular 
physical realizer property of that event.  
                                                 
25 We cite Pettit here because of the context, but this objection is common to several critics of our 
view; see Ehring (1996, 1999) and Yablo (1992), for example.  Note that Pettit’s use of ‘state’ here 
must mean ‘property-instance’.   20
It is worth clarifying what would be wrong with such an identification from 
our point of view.  One could only identify the causal relevance of an intentional 
property (say, the property of being the belief that p) with that of a particular realizer 
of that property (say, the property of being neuro-chemical state α) if that realizer’s 
relevance was shared by all the other (possible) realizers of the intentional state.  This 
identification, if correct, would lead immediately to the reduction of the intentional 
property to its realizer, there being no other realizers whose causal relevance differed, 
thus defeating our aim of establishing the possibility of non-reductive monism. 
What the criticism does, though, is conflate the requirements on causal 
efficacy, which concerns events, with those on causal explanation, which concerns 
what we have been calling causal relevance.  As noted above, our view is that the 
causal efficacy of events is just one condition on the causal relevance of the properties 
of those events.  The notion of ‘being relevant in virtue of property P rather than 
property Q’, whether this concerns properties that are co-instanced or whether it 
concerns properties connected by the ‘ensuring’ relation, can only be made sense of in 
terms of the causal power of the property instanced, this power making that property 
relevant for the causal explanation of (an aspect of) the effect. The property, being the 
desire that q, will be relevant to the causing of a number of appropriate actions, 
appropriate given the content of the desire. Those actions will be caused, in part at 
least, in virtue of the agent’s having that desire (i.e., exemplifying the property, 
desires that q).  On different occasions a desire with the same content will be 
variously realized (given non-reduction) by different first-order physical properties, 
and while those realizers may be relevant to (and so explanatory of) the actions 
physically described, the claim is that it will be in virtue of the desire’s being a desire 
that q that the action, intentionally described, is performed.  
If this is what is meant by in virtue of, and the related notion of causal 
relevance, then we agree with Pettit that it is only some properties of events that are 
causally relevant to the effects they produce.  Which properties they are will depend 
on which aspects (properties of) the effect one wants explained.  But none of this 
touches on the point about causal efficacy.  It is clear that on our account not all 
properties whose instances are causally efficacious will be causally and so 
explanatorily relevant (though we do insist that any causally relevant property must 
be one whose instances are causally efficacious).  Thus, suppose that a window has a 
shattering point of 5 lbs, and shatters because it is struck by a 7 lb rock thrown at it.  It   21
is causally relevant that the rock weighs over 5 lbs, even though this instance of 
weighing over 5 lbs is also an instance of weighing over 2 lbs.  The throwing of a 
rock weighing over 2 lbs won’t explain the window’s shattering, though in this case 
the instance of the property, weighing over 2 lbs, just is an instance of weighing over 
5 lbs (= an instance of weighing 7 lbs), and so the throwing caused the shattering.  
The property, weighing over 2 lbs, does not help explain the shattering because other 
instances of it in rock-throwings won’t be ones in which the window will shatter.  But 
this truth about other instances is irrelevant to the causal efficacy of this instance, it 
being pertinent only to the matter of causal relevance. 
It is difficult to see why this outcome should be problematic.  Any view of the 
causal relation that takes it to be an extensional relation, relating items ‘in the world,’ 
will have the consequence that some causally efficacious properties, properties whose 
instances are causally efficacious, will not illuminatingly explain the effects they 
bring about.  They will not, in these cases, be causally relevant properties.  The only 
way to avoid this result is to drastically change the metaphysics presupposed here, 
that of properties and instances and the PEA account of events, a metaphysics to 
which Pettit seems committed.
26  Short of this, one can only avoid this consequence 
(on the assumption of extensionality) by insisting that no causally efficacious instance 
can be an instance of more than one property, thus ensuring that causal efficacy and 
relevance cannot come apart.  This is an extraordinarily strong claim to make given 
the obvious counterexamples presented by instances of different determinates of a 
determinable.  Take the example just given.  The rock’s weighing over 5 lbs is 
relevant to (and so explanatory of) the window’s shattering; its weighing over 2 lbs 
may be relevant to my toe’s hurting when it falls onto that toe.  Its weighing 7 lbs is 
both its weighing over 5 lbs and its weighing over 2 lbs; one surely multiplies 
instances beyond necessity by insisting that these are all distinct instances.  
Pettit himself needs something like the distinction between efficacy and 
relevance, even on his account where programming properties are said to be causally 
relevant but not causally efficacious.  On this account, some properties that program 
for their effects do not figure in illuminating accounts of why those effects occurred.   
That the eraser was elastic programs for its bending, but its elasticity can be inferred 
                                                 
26 We explore, and reject, a challenge to this metaphysics stemming from a specific version of trope 
theory (Robb, 1997, 2001), which takes the properties whose causal relevance is in question to be 
tropes themselves, in C. Macdonald and G. Macdonald (forthcoming).   22
from knowledge of its molecular structure, making the dispositional property 
(elasticity) ‘insignificant’.  So, Pettit adds the requirement that the programming 
property be ‘significant’, thus ensuring its explanatory relevance.  If causal relevance 
requires ‘significance’, we can avail ourselves of this resource without going the 
circuitous and difficult route of ‘programming’.  We say that only some properties 
whose instances are causally efficacious are ‘significant’, or causally relevant, to their 
effects.
27  That some are not is irrelevant as an objection to our account.  
It is worth noting that in the example just cited, that of elasticity, it would be 
strongly counter-intuitive to insist that when the dispositional property of being 
elastic is realized, its instances are not instances of the realizing property.  In general, 
we claim, whenever a higher-order property is a functional property, it is co-instanced 
with its realizing properties – and so is as causally efficacious as they are.  That being 
elastic is not a significant programming property is not germane here, since that does 
not change its status as a programming property.  On the PE model, what lack of 
significance does is render the property causally irrelevant and so non-explanatory. 
This might make it look as though no higher-order property can be causally relevant, 
in the sense that it can have a causal profile that cannot be identified that of their 
lower-order realizers.  But we deny this too, for the reasons given in section 4 above. 
We take it that the above establishes our strategy as intuitively more 
acceptable than one that makes mental properties causally inert.  It secures the causal 
efficacy of such properties, and avoids over-determination, all in an ontologically 
parsimonious way.  Moreover, its main device, co-instantiation, receives independent 
support from considerations stemming from the realization relation.  However, its 
claim to be the best available strategy has been challenged (Kim 1999) and this 
challenge could be seen to provide indirect support for Pettit’s view that the higher-
order properties are not causally effective in producing the events that they explain.  
Kim’s challenge takes the form of an argument that purports to show that if 
supervenient properties have causal powers then they are reducible to the properties 
on which they supervene.  If correct, this would defeat our aim to show how 
                                                 
27 The conditions for causal relevance are spelled out in more detail in C. Macdonald and G. 
Macdonald (1995).  We think that the problem of ‘significance’ will be inevitable on any account of 
causal relevance, since relevance has to do with explanatory potential, and this will vary from context 
to context, depending on the type of effect to be explained.  Moreover, even within a single context, 
there will be properties whose instances are causally efficacious but the properties themselves will not 
be causally relevant, as the above examples illustrate.  This just goes to show that it is a mistake to 
think that there is such a thing as causal relevance tout court.    23
irreducible mental properties can be both causally efficacious and causally relevant, 
since, in order for our solution to work, it must be possible for there to be emergent 
properties.  We defend this possibility below, again on the basis of the crucial 
distinction between properties and their instances.  
 
6.  The Possibility of Causal Relevance 
 
For some time now Jaegwon Kim has been arguing that the non-reductive 
monist’s picture of the mind is seriously unstable, the instability making the ‘non-
reductive’ aspect untenable.  Consider Fodor’s non-reductive monism, where the 
reduction of mental properties is rejected on the grounds that they are variously 
realized, where this means that their base realizing properties are heterogeneous.  
Given this heterogeneity, it is claimed that the subvening property formed by 
disjoining the particular realizing properties will not form a natural kind, thus 
blocking reduction to that disjunctive property.  The lower-order properties cannot 
form disjunctive antecedents and consequents of a single law, so a bridge law is ruled 
out.
28  The problem, as Kim sees it here, is that we need an answer to the question of 
why the supervening property, say pain, is not “…equally heterogeneous and 
nonnomic as a kind” (Kim 1993: 323).  Failing one, we must take seriously the 
thought that the variably realized supervening properties cannot figure in laws, not 
even ceteris paribus laws, leading to the conclusion that there are no ‘special 
sciences’ (on the assumption that all scientific explanation is law-based).  
 A related argument concentrates on the causal powers of the supervening and 
subvening properties.  This begins by noting that the non-reductive monist is 
committed to there being a difference between the causal powers of properties at the 
subvening and supervening level, those at the subvening level forming a 
heterogeneous set, those at the supervening level supposedly being homogeneous. 
The threat that arises is that the supervening properties will have no unified causal 
powers, thus making them causally irrelevant.
29  Recently Kim has advanced an 
argument along these lines, coming to a conclusion that has the form of a dilemma: 
                                                 
28 Thus, he says, “the lower level disjunctive antecedent is not a natural kind, and so is not law-apt – 
“…a badly heterogeneous disjunction is unsuited for laws” (Kim 1993: 318).  Note that Kim’s most 
recent view (Kim 1998, 2005) is that bridge laws are neither necessary nor sufficient for reduction, 
since there is functional reduction (which he endorses).  
29 For an early formulation of such an argument see G. Macdonald (1986).   24
either the supervening mental properties are causally inert, or they are reducible (Kim 
1999, 2003).  Either way, it is bad news for non-reductive monism, which needs 
irreducible higher order properties that possess (independent) causal powers.  
Such properties would be, in our terminology, emergent ones, having a 
distinctive causal profile.  According to Kim’s argument, if there were such emergent 
properties then ‘downward causation’ would be possible, and downward causation is 
incoherent.  The argument for downward causation goes like this.  Emergent 
properties must have distinctive causal powers.  They must be capable of being 
causally effective in bringing about their own distinctive effects.  Suppose that they 
only bring about effects of the same (higher-order) level.  These effects will be 
higher-order effects (given that emergent properties themselves are higher-order).  
But this means that the higher-order effects will have lower-order realizations.  So, it 
is by causing instances of the lower-order (base) realizing properties that an emergent 
property will cause a higher-order effect.  So higher-order causation presupposes 
downward causation. 
Why, according to Kim, is downward causation incoherent?  Consider 
emergent properties M1 and M2, where M1 causes M2’s instantiation, M1 being 
realized by P1 and M2 realized by P2.  Given that M2 ‘arises out of’ (is realized by) 
P2, M2 would be instantiated by P2’s instantiation, regardless of whether M1 had 
caused M2.  Simplicity dictates that M1 causes M2’s instantiation by causing P2 to be 
instantiated (the ‘Downward Causation’ conclusion). But given that M1 is realized by 
P1, and given irreducibility (i.e., that M1≠P1), we now have two sufficient causes of 
P2.  This embarrassment of causal power can only be resolved by (a) eliminating M1 
or P1 as a cause of P2, or (b) sacrificing irreducibility.  Pettit takes the first option, 
giving up on the causal power of the mental, Kim the second. 
Kim concludes that the emergent property M1 does not independently cause 
P2’s instantiation: what is doing the causal work is what realizes M1, namely, P1.  So 
the so-called emergent property has no (distinctive) causal power, and M1 has no 
independent causal relevance.  From this, given the previously stated assumptions, we 
can conclude that the special sciences cannot be defended by relying on the model 
that takes special science properties to be higher-order properties that are variably 
realized by, but irreducible to, physical ones.  “If emergent properties exist, they are   25
causally, and hence explanatorily, inert and therefore largely useless for the purpose 
of causal/explanatory theories” (Kim 1999: 33).
30 
 
7.  A Different Argument Against Downward Causation 
 
Given the hierarchical picture of the sciences presented here, it might look as 
though Kim has a sound argument for the causal irrelevance of emergent properties.  
But we claim that the argument is not sound.  In this final section we want to show 
that there is a sense in which it is true that downward causation is incoherent.  But the 
route to that conclusion is significantly different from Kim’s, and leads to different 
consequences.  In particular, it rescues the possibility of the causal relevance of 
(some) higher-order properties, mental ones included. 
The argument, as presented, shuttles between talking of the downward causal 
power of properties and that of their instances.  It is not that Kim is unaware of the 
importance of the property/instance distinction.  He recognizes that “Properties as 
such don’t enter into causal relations; when we say M causes M*, that is short for ‘An 
instance of M causes an instance of M*’ or ‘An instantiation of M causes M* to 
instantiate on that occasion’.” (Kim 2003: 155)
31  But if we keep this distinction in 
mind, his conclusion that ‘higher-order causation is downward causation’ does not 
follow as immediately as he thinks it does.  The crucial move in the argument is taken 
when downward causation is said to be required even for causation at the same 
(higher-order) level.  The higher-order ‘effect’ (M2) is realized in a lower order 
property (P2), and it is an instance of the lower-order property that is caused by (an 
instance of) the higher-order M1.  As noted above, M1 does this by being realized by 
P1, the consequence being, so Kim argues, that either P1 does all the causal work, or 
M1=P1.  Kim opts for the latter solution, rescuing the M1–M2 ‘causal’ relation by 
ensuring, via reducibility, that it is the same relation as the P1-P2 ‘causal’ relation.
32  
                                                 
30 This argument is updated in Kim (2003).  In the earlier paper Kim took the argument to show that 
the mental was causally inert, in the later paper he stresses the reducibility of the mental.  If we can 
show that the mental can be causally relevant we will have defused the argument for reducibility. 
31 He also says: “The fact that properties M and P must be implicated in the identity, or non-identity, of 
M and P instances can be seen from the fact that “An M-instance causes a P-instance” must be 
understood with the proviso “in virtue of the former being an instance of M and the latter being an 
instance of P”…” (Kim 2003:157).  On our view, this conflates causal efficacy with causal relevance.   
32 Our use of scare quotes around key terms here in this paragraph is intended to mark the equivocation 
we detect in the argument between talk of property-instances and causal efficacy, and talk of properties 
and causal relevance.   26
Diagramically, his picture of the situation is this (Kim 2003: 166): 
 
M1 -------causes---Æ M2 
      =      is reductively     = 
                       identical with 
P1 -------causes-----ÆP2 
   Figure A 
 
i.e., causation between mental properties just is causation between physical 
properties, since mental properties are physical properties.  But this picture plainly 
flouts the distinction Kim explicitly recognizes.  The story should go: the putatively 
higher order M1 has an instance, M1i, that causes an instance of M2, M2i, and does 
this (according to Kim) by means of an instance (P1i), of its realizing base’s causing 
an instance of M2’s realizing base, P2i.  Read this way, there is a sense in which we 
agree with Kim’s conclusion: the causal relation between M1i and M2i is the same as 
the causal relation between P1i and P2i.  The picture looks like this: 
 
M1i -------causes---Æ M2i 
      =    is identical with     = 
P1i -------causes-----ÆP2i 
   Figure B 
 
i.e., causation between mental events just is causation between physical events, since 
mental events are physical events.  But the obvious question now is: why is the 
supervening property said to be either reducible or causally inert, when the natural 
assumption, one argued for in preceding sections of this paper, is that the supervening 
and base properties share instances?  If there is just one instance of both the 
supervening and the base property, then it is true that there is no ‘downward 
causation’, where this now means that there are no higher-order instances of 
properties that cause lower-order instances of properties.  There is no distinction 
between levels of instances, only between levels of properties.  But this is 
unremarkable, and does not have the consequences drawn by Kim.  This ‘fact’ of no 
downward causation does not lead to the conclusion that the higher-order properties   27
are causally inert, nor does it lead, without further argument, to the conclusion that 
they are reducible.  The causal efficacy of the instance is as secure as the causal 
efficacy of the base instance, given there is here only one instance.  All that is needed 
to secure the causal power of the supervening property is the plausible additional 
premise that if a property has instances that are causally efficacious then the property 
has causal powers.  And if the higher-order property is irreducible, then it will have 
independent causal relevance; it will have a causal ‘profile’ different from that of its 
particular realizing properties.  So what drives Kim to his skeptical conclusion? 
  Kim’s skeptical attitude is to the very idea that properties that are wholly 
distinct might nevertheless be co-instantiated in a single instance, and it is anchored in 
his views on the metaphysics of events.
33  These views go beyond commitment to the 
Property-Exemplification (PEA) Account, since, as we have seen in Section 4, that 
account can be consistently combined with non-reductive monism.   Kim’s skeptical 
attitude is due to his further commitment to (1) the view that mental properties of 
persons are constitutive properties of the events that are (i.e., are identical with) 
instances of them, and (2) the view that events have only one constitutive property.  
Given that physical properties are constitutive properties of the events that are 
instances of them, the identity condition on events entails that it can only be that 
M1i=P1i if M1=P1 (and similarly for M2i and P2i and M2 and P2).  Given 
distinctness of the M properties and the P ones, distinctness of the instances is 
assured, and epiphenomenalism, both at the level of causal efficacy (of events) and at 
the level of causal relevance, looms. 
  However, non-reductive monists – even those that commit themselves to the 
PEA – are free to reject (1) and/or (2) and thereby to block the epiphenomenalist 
conclusion.  If, for example, (2) is rejected, then non-reductive monists can argue that 
mental/physical events have two constitutive properties, one mental and one physical, 
both of which need to figure in their identity conditions, and this is possible 
compatibly with the distinctness of the properties instanced.
34   Taking this line would 
                                                 
33 Thus, when discussing the relation between the mental property M and it’s subvening P, he says “To 
continue, from Irreducibility we have (6) M ≠ P” and notes “…this only means that this instance of M 
≠ this instance of P.  Does this mean that a Davidsonian “token identity” suffices here?  The answer is 
no: the relevant sense in which an instance of M = an instance of P requires either property identity M 
= P or some form of reductive relationship between them.” (Kim 2005: 42) 
34 One might think this is inconsistent with the existence and identity conditions of events as stated by 
the PEA account, but it is not (though it is inconsistent with Kim’s claims on behalf of that account). 
As Lombard points out,    28
leave the relation between mental and physical properties unresolved, however, so we 
prefer to reject (1): mental properties are not constitutive properties of the events that 
are instances of them, but rather, supervene on such properties (in the sense specified 
in Section 4).   But this is something any physicalist who thinks that physicalism is 
true and contingent should do.      
There is an argument in Kim (1999) that looks as though it will still deliver 
the unwelcome conclusion.  The critical move is made by the claim that where the 
realizing relation holds between properties, the instance of the realized property has 
identical causal powers to that of the instance of the realizer property (so the causal 
powers of M1i and P1i are the same).  Kim construes this as flowing from the causal 
inheritance principle, which says that, in cases of higher-order/lower-order causation, 
the instance of the higher order-property ‘inherits’ all its causal power from the 
instance of the lower-order property.  But this causal inheritance principle is not 
obviously derivable from the less controversial claim that identical instances have 
identical causal powers, and even this is controversial enough.  Let’s consider the 
identity claim first before returning to the inheritance claim.  
The identity claim looks uncontroversial; indeed, it looks like it provides the 
ground for the conclusion that the supervening property is causally efficacious, and 
hence has causal power.  It provides support for the efficacy claim because, as we 
have remarked before,  ‘… is causally efficacious’ is an extensional context.  If this is 
all that is entailed by the causal inheritance principle, then there can be no objection 
to it.  But there is a way of reading the attribution of causal power to an instance that 
suggests that it is the property instanced, and not the instance itself, whose causal 
power is in question.  What this ambiguity can do is camouflage an inference from the 
identity of what we will call instance causal power to a conclusion about the identity 
of causal powers of the property instanced.  This inference would enable one to move 
                                                                                                                                            
  Suppose that an event, e1 , is x’s exemplifying of F at t, and that an event, e2 , is x’s 
 exemplifying  of  G at t, where F and G are distinct properties. Despite the fact that Kim’s 
  criterion of identity for events says that events are identical only if they are exemplifyings of 
  the same property, that condition does not imply that e1 and e2 are distinct events. Nothing in 
  that condition or in Kim’s existence condition for events says that e1 could not, in addition to 
  being an exemplifying of F, be an exemplifying of G, and that e2 could not, in addition to 
  being an exemplifying of G, be an exemplifying of F. And if those were the facts, then e1 and 
  e2 would be exemplifyings of the same properties by the same objects at the same times, and 
  hence would be, according to Kim’s criterion, identical. …that latter idea [that an event can be 
  an exemplifying of only one property] is a consequence, not of the view that events are 
  exemplifyings of properties by objects at times, but of the view that events are explicanda, a   29
from accepting the picture as presented in Figure B to accepting the picture as 
presented in Figure A.  And it is in fact this further inference that Kim needs in order 
to arrive at his skeptical conclusion concerning the impossibility of emergent 
properties.  But this inference is infirm, so the skepticism is unwarranted.  Additional 
argument is required in order to be entitled to conclude, from a claim about the 
identity of the causal power of the instance of co-instanced properties, that the two 
properties thus co-instanced have the same causal power.  In our example, M1i = P1i, 
so it is clear that as instances they have the same causal power. But that does not by 
itself license the inference to the conclusion that M1 and P1 have the same causal 
power, since this has to do with instances of M1 and P1 in addition to M1i and P1i.  
Further, given the possibility of variable realizability, it is clear that we are not 
entitled to conclude, from the fact that M1i=P1i, that every instance of M1 is an 
instance of P1.  
In the case being considered by Kim it is unlikely that an argument to this 
conclusion can be mounted that will not beg the question about the coherence of the 
notion that emergent properties have distinctive causal powers.  Ironically, some of 
the points made by Pettit in favour of program explanation support this view.  As we 
noted earlier, Pettit has made a convincing case for there being supervening properties 
that are explanatorily significant.  Such properties are, on the PE model, those that 
ensure their realization in properties from which one cannot just ‘read off’ the causal 
relevance of the higher-order property.  The model being examined is one of higher-
order property causation, and we are assuming, consistent with Kim’s starting point, 
that the higher-order property is co-instanced in different situations with different 
base (lower-order) properties.  These base properties have, ex hypothesi, different 
causal powers, and, on the plausible assumption that the causal powers of each such 
property differ from those of any other, it is impossible for the higher-order property 
to possess the same causal power of each lower-order realizing property.  Connected 
to this is the point alluded to by Pettit, that the difference in causal power can be 
detected by counterfactualising: a mental property, say, intending to pay that bill, can 
cause the action of paying the bill, and without that intention the action would not 
have occurred.  But it may be false that without the particular realizer property being 
instanced, the bill would not have been paid.  The intention could have been realized 
                                                                                                                                            
  view from which Kim’s property-exemplifying account is ultimately derived.” (Lombard   30
by a different base property.  So the causal powers of supervening properties can have 
different profiles from that of the properties supervened upon.  There can be emergent 
properties, properties that are causally relevant to the effects they produce, even 
though there is no ‘pernicious’ downward causation.  
 
8. Conclusion.   
 
We have examined Program Explanation and found its metaphysics suspect: 
resistance to the co-instantiation of realized and realizing properties is unmotivated, 
and it causes needless problems with the interpretation of the essential ‘ensuring’ 
relation.  In addition, it renders instances of intentional properties causally 
inefficacious, a strongly counter-intuitive result.  Giving up this non-identity should 
be palatable to Pettit once the distinction between causal efficacy and causal 
relevance is recognized and respected, given that his objection to our view appears to 
depend only on a conflation of the two.  We have argued that the preferred alternative 
re-instates the causal efficacy of the mental while avoiding the problem of causal 
over-determination.  This, however, still leaves open the possibility that, though not 
causally inert, mental properties may be causally irrelevant, so explanatorily inert.  
We therefore concluded by addressing an argument of Kim’s to the effect that higher-
order properties could not be causally relevant, as they could not have distinctive 
causal powers.  Kim’s conclusion, it was argued, derived from an equivocal premise.  
Disambiguating that premise destroyed the pessimistic conclusion that such properties 
are “largely useless for the purpose of causal/explanatory theories” (Kim 1999: 33).  
There can be higher-order properties with distinctive causal powers, and so non-
reductive monism lives on. 
 
 
Cynthia Macdonald and Graham Macdonald
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